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Abstract  
 
In 2016, China officially ended the “one-child” policy permitting all couples to have two children 
for the first time since 1979. While the policy was relaxed due to demographic concerns, it has 
simultaneously given many women a new reproductive opportunity. The goal of this study was 
to qualitatively understand the childbearing decision process in the new era of the two-child 
policy. We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 45 postpartum women at two 
hospitals in Zhejiang Province, China. The interviews explored women’s views on the two-child 
policy and reproductive decisions and how they decided to have their first or second child. Most 
women approved of the lifting of the one-child policy; however, many were hesitant or uncertain 
about their own decisions to have second children. Many felt pressured to have two children for 
the good of, or as an obligation to, the family. However, they also felt that caring for two children 
was burdensome, and that they would have to sacrifice a lot in terms of freedom, energy and 
money. Their responses to the new reproductive opportunity highlights the complexity of 
childbearing decision-making in modern Chinese society, against a background of persisting 
traditional values. 
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Introduction 
 
As a response to rapid population growth during the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese government 
imposed a restrictive family planning policy in 1979, limiting urban Han couples to one child, and 
rural Han couples with a first-born daughter to two children (members of minority ethnic groups 
were allowed to have two or more children). Population control was seen as a necessity for 
improving the state’s economic prospects after nearly 30 years of Mao Zedong’s leadership. The 
campaign, through easy access to contraception and abortion, as well as penalties for exceeding 
allowed births, resulted in a decrease in total fertility rate from 2.8 in 1979 to around 1.5 in 2009 
(Morgan, Zhigang and Hayford 2009). However, the policy had unintended demographic 
consequences including: population ageing, sex imbalance from sex-selective abortion, and a 
labour shortage (Guo and Gu 2014; Zhao and Chen 2011; Wang 2011).  For its critics, it has also 
violated the reproductive rights of individuals and families, and has caused undue burden on 
only-child couples who must care for one child and four parents, referred to in China as the 4:2:1 
phenomenon (Wang, Cai and Gu 2013; Hesketh, Lu and Xing 2005).   
Largely because of the demographic consequences, the government has gradually relaxed 
the policy. In 2007, all provinces began to permit couples who were both only children to have 
two children, in 2013 if at least one of the parents was an only child, and finally in 2016 for all 
couples (Hesketh, Lu and Xing 2005; Zeng and Hesketh 2016). There are no longer social and 
economic privileges for one-child couples, and contraception is a matter of choice, dissociating it 
from family planning policy. Women are now being offered procedures to remove intrauterine 
devices or reverse tubal ligation, to enable them to have a second child (Attané 2016). These 
measures demonstrate how the Chinese government has shifted from a restrictive reproductive 
stance to one that encourages couples to have two children. 
 Scholars have long been pushing for the relaxation of the one-child policy (Wang 2005; 
Hesketh, Lu and Xing 2005). China already has far below replacement fertility rates, which now 
can be largely attributed to socioeconomic development rather than government intervention  
(Cai 2010; Guo and Gu 2014; Wang, Cai and Gu 2013).  After the earlier relaxation of regulations, 
fewer eligible couples than expected opted for a second child (Basten and Jiang 2015; Attané 
2016). In line with other developed nations, studies have shown that higher educational 
attainment and delayed childbearing, costs associated with childrearing, increasing investment 
in fewer children, and social norms have all contributed to couples’ choice not to have second 
children (Zheng et al. 2009; Merli and Morgan 2011; Eklund 2016; Attané 2016). 
 However, current rhetoric on this issue mainly centres on demographic issues, the sex 
ratio, population ageing and the economy. Moreover, most of the fertility literature is either non-
empirical, or quantitative research that uses survey data or focuses on fertility outcomes. There 
has been very little qualitative exploration of the childbearing decision process, particularly from 
the perspectives of women, after the implementation of the two-child policy. Therefore, in this 
paper we intend to contextualise childbearing and reproduction in terms of individual decisions 
and family histories, and to describe the structural circumstances that may constrain those 
decisions. Our aim is to explore how women make decisions about childbearing, with their new 
reproductive choices since the lifting of the one-child policy.  
 
Methods 
 
Setting and Population 
  
This study was part of a larger project examining the effects of the two-child policy on 
reproductive and delivery decision-making. Our study took place in two cities, Jiangshan and 
Hangzhou, in Zhejiang province. Zhejiang is one of the most urbanised and developed provinces 
in China, where educational attainment of women is relatively high and the fertility rate is 
relatively low, around 1.35 in 2010 (Cai 2010; Wang 2014; Peng 2011). Jiangshan is a county-level 
city and consists largely of a rural population, while Hangzhou is the capital and most populous 
city in the province, consisting of a largely urban population.  
We interviewed postpartum women and providers at a county-level hospital in Jiangshan 
and a provincial-level hospital in Hangzhou between November 2016 and April 2017. The 
maternity hospital in Jiangshan is a 72-bed, secondary-level hospital serving a largely rural 
population. The maternity hospital in Hangzhou is a 500-bed tertiary referral hospital, serving a 
largely urban population. Because we conducted this research in the year after the two-child 
policy was universalised, a substantial proportion of our interviewees were older mothers, over 
the age of 35, giving birth to their second child immediately in response to the policy change. 
Interviewing these two populations in this unusual timeframe enabled us to compare urban 
versus rural experiences, as well as understand women’s attitudes towards the two-child policy. 
 
Study design 
 
We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 45 postpartum women, 24 from 
Hangzhou and 21 from Jiangshan, and 7 service providers which allowed us to reach saturation 
of themes. Nurses and physicians non-randomly identified women who were two to five days 
postpartum and who were of different parities and birth outcomes.  We approached the women, 
explained the purpose of the study and asked for their consent to be interviewed and tape-
recorded. The interviews explored women’s views on the two-child policy, their birth experience, 
delivery decisions and reproductive decisions, namely how they decided to have their first or 
second child, or, if primiparous, whether they anticipated having a second child. We also 
interviewed four nurse-midwives and three obstetricians about their personal and professional 
views of the delivery decision-making process.  
 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
 
The sociodemographic characteristics of the women interviewed are summarised in Table 1. The 
average age of the interviewees was around 32 in both Hangzhou and Jiangshan, although there 
was a wider range of maternal age in Jiangshan. We also note that there was a relatively large 
number of women 35 years or older, which in China is considered advanced maternal age; this 
reflects the temporary increase in older women giving birth immediately after the two-child 
policy was implemented. In fact, of the multiparous women interviewed, the mean age of their 
first child was 7 and 8, in Hangzhou and Jiangshan respectively, with a range from 2 to 21. In 
addition, the level of education of women in the Hangzhou hospital was much higher than in 
Jiangshan, with more than 87% having attained some form of higher education, compared to 
43%. Similarly, the majority of women in Hangzhou held a job at the time of childbirth, while 
many women in Jiangshan did not, or had quit their temporary jobs for pregnancy and 
childrearing.  
 
Analysis 
 
Interviews were translated and transcribed into English. We followed a grounded theory 
approach to organise the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). We inductively developed conceptual 
codes from the interviews, and then extracted and organised responses by code.  Memos were 
created for each code, and then the data were analysed for patterns and organised into larger 
themes. In our final analysis, we have selected and integrated stories of women with current 
frameworks on intergenerational and gender relations to illustrate how large-scale policy 
changes affect on-the-ground practices and negotiations in fertility. The names in this paper are 
pseudonyms, to protect the identity of the participants. The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of Zhejiang University. 
 
Findings  
 
After the Lifting of the One-Child Policy: The Decision to Have a Second Child 
 
Most women approved of the lifting of the one-child policy, perceiving it as a decision that was 
good for the country, while also expanding reproductive choice.  However, as we will describe 
below, the new possibility complicated personal childbearing decision-making. Some women felt 
pressured to have two children for the future of the family, but, on the other hand, felt 
constrained by limited time, energy and money to care for a second child. 
 
The Value of Children: Managing Intra- and Intergenerational Relations 
 
“One child is too solitary” 
 
For many women, the decision to have a second child was not based on personal fulfilment, but 
on the consideration of the future of the family, as well as pressures from their parents and in-
laws. Many noted that they needed to have a second child because one child was too gu dan or 
solitary. They explained the need for more than one child in two, related ways. First, women 
viewed the role of children as being able to stay close and take care of them when they became 
old or infirm. With more children, it was more likely that this would be the case. Lin immediately 
decided to give birth to her second child after the policy change. She emphasised the role of 
family:  
 
“Money is secondary. Medical care can be reimbursed with health insurance. What’s 
more important is having someone to look after you. If you have kids, you can call them 
over if you’re sick. If no one is around, who will take you to the hospital?” (39 years old, 
Jiangshan, vocational college, small shop owner)  
 
Second, women thought about the well-being of and burden on their children in the 
future. They emphasised that children with siblings could have a companion to discuss and share 
family matters with. One nurse-midwife, Peijing, expressed similar views to Lin: 
 
“One child is too lonely. My husband has an older sister, and if their father gets sick, then 
they can discuss it together. If you’re dealing with this by yourself, of course you would 
feel lonely or helpless.” (35 years old, Hangzhou, vocational college, nurse-midwife) 
 
As Chinese society revolves around family, multiple generations are bound in an contract 
of obligations and expectations between generations (Croll 2006; Göransson 2013). Built on a 
Confucian sense of filial obligation, adult children in China are expected to provide for their 
parents in old age as a reciprocation for the resources they spent in raising them, a legal 
responsibility enshrined in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Göransson 2013; 
Eklund and Göransson 2016; Bartlett and Phillips 1997). An only child with his or her partner has 
to take care of four parents, increasing their intergenerational burden—the so-called “4-2-1” 
phenomenon. Many interviewees referred to this, describing the need to provide siblings to 
share obligations. Moreover, some women reflected on the difficulty of being only children 
themselves and therefore perceived value in having siblings for their own children (Eklund 2016), 
such as Jia who said: 
 
“As I grow older as an only child, I feel like I can’t go far from home—even if I want to do 
something I want—because my parents are here. If you have siblings, everyone can share the 
tasks [of taking care of elderly parents].” (33 years old, Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree, 
temporarily unemployed) 
 
Generational pressures  
 
Even as women were thinking ahead for the next generation’s sake, some also expressed how 
their decision to have two children was influenced by pressure from their parents or in-laws. 
Hualing had just given birth to her first child and was already thinking how hard it would be to 
consider another. She said:  
 
“Chinese people think duo zi duo fu (“the more children, the more happiness”). It’s not 
like we actually want to [have another child], but our parents compel us to. They say, ‘Oh, 
when are you having another? Look at how cute this child is! Having two is great!’ They 
think, if you had a child for one side [of the family] you need to have another child for the 
other side.” (26 years old, Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree, temporarily unemployed) 
 
Some parents encouraged grown daughters to have two children because they 
themselves were not given that choice when they were of age. Jinghua, a 23-year-old from 
Jiangshan, had just given birth to her first child. While she did not particularly want to have 
another child, given her financial circumstances, she already felt pressured to:  
 
“For my mother-in-law’s generation… they all had one child. And if both parents were 
only children, then how can you have only one child? The older generation thinks that it’s 
better to have more children to enliven the family atmosphere.” (23 years old, Jiangshan, 
high school, supermarket supervisor) 
 
From our interviews, we found that children are not only of value to parents, but to 
grandparents, who themselves grew up with siblings and large extended families (Eklund and 
Göransson 2016). As Hualing noted, one grandchild may be seen as too few to be “shared” among 
four grandparents; at the very least, both the maternal and paternal grandparents should have 
one. Having children, therefore, is not a matter of individual considerations, but is deeply 
embedded in generational obligations and relationships.  
This generational pressure extended beyond personal relationships. For example, Meilin 
was a 32-year-old woman who had just given birth to her second son in Jiangshan. Her pregnancy 
was unintended, and she had planned on having an abortion. The family business was not doing 
too well, and the prospect of raising two children was financially daunting. However, her decision 
changed when she went to the OB/GYN clinic: 
 
“I saw a young woman who tried everything to have a child but couldn’t. Now with the 
two-child policy, I also saw 40, 50-year-old women, who wanted to get pregnant but also 
couldn’t. The doctor told me: ‘Look at all these women, they want to have a child, yet 
they cannot. Look at your own child, so healthy. Why don’t you want it?’ So, then my 
husband said ji lai zhi, ze an zhi (‘since this is so, we should accept it’).” (32 years old, 
Jiangshan, high school, shop owner)  
 
Meilin, in the end, did not regret her decision to have a second child. However, it is 
remarkable that her decision, in part, relied on the argument that children are a privilege that 
certain women of the previous generation could not repossess, demonstrating the influence of 
historical regret.   
 
Pressure from children 
 
Given that we were interviewing women at an unusual time in China’s demographic history, 
where women in their late 30s and 40s unexpectedly had the opportunity to have more than one 
child, many mothers had first children who were old enough to be a part of the second-child 
decision-making process. Sometimes the first child urged their parents to have another, so they 
could have company. Others, typically older children, rejected the idea of more siblings for fear 
of dividing their parents’ love and attention. Huiqing, the oldest woman interviewed at the age 
of 45, told us her 17-year-old daughter did not want her to have a second child after the policy 
was relaxed:  
 
“[Our daughter] was an only child, so she was always spoiled. For us as parents, we 
consider the family as a whole [when making these decisions]. Maybe she thought that 
she would have to share everything with him. She’s a modern, independent person. I told 
her: ‘if you had a little brother or sister, then when mom and dad are old, it might relieve 
your burden of taking care of us.’ She told me, ‘it doesn’t matter, I can take care of you 
myself.’” (45 years old, Jiangshan, middle school, homemaker) 
 
While some children were reluctant, others would outright refuse to have another sibling. For 
example, Lihua told the story of her neighbour whose 16-year-old son refused to let her continue 
her pregnancy:  
 
“[My neighbour] was two-months pregnant when she told her son [about the pregnancy]. 
Her son refused to eat for three days and three nights. He wouldn’t go to school or 
anything else. She couldn’t do anything else but have an abortion. She had to give it up.” 
(44 years old, Hangzhou, middle school) 
 
Lihua repeatedly discussed how there were many cases of older children who would refuse to 
have a sibling. She speculated: “I wonder if children these days are just too selfish. They just think 
of themselves.”  
Whether pregnancies were intended or unintended, women with children older than five 
often felt they had to consider their child’s opinion in the childbearing decision process. Children 
who did not want a sibling complicated the second-child decision, and women who went against 
their child’s wishes had to figure out how to manage these relationships within the family. Some 
women attributed this self-centeredness to the fact that they were only children, a characteristic 
that women who could choose their birth spacing wanted to avoid. Ju, a 26-year-old from 
Hangzhou, spaced her births three years apart. She wanted to have them close in age, so as to 
avoid the “only child” personality. She commented that ever since the one-child policy, children 
“are pretty selfish. They’ve been jiaosheng-guanyang (pampered and spoiled).” Yina, a 35-year-
old second-time mother, echoed this sentiment, applauding the change in the family planning 
policy and emphasising the need for siblings: “Now a lot of children have bad temperaments. 
Children before weren’t like that. Some kids even yell at their grandparents.”  
 
A Woman’s Sacrifice  
 
As we have shown, many women wanted, or were pressured, to have children for familial and 
generational considerations.  However, these important factors also had to be weighed against 
the costs. Regardless of whether women decided to have more than one child, all talked about 
childbearing and childrearing in terms of sacrifice, which can be categorised into physical, 
personal and financial sacrifices.  
 
Sacrificing the body 
 
Lihua, at 44 years of age, was one of the oldest women interviewed; her first son was already 21 
years old. Her pregnancy was unintended, and she had hesitated to keep it. She had been born 
in the 1970s and never imagined she would have another child. While some women took 
advantage of the childbearing opportunity immediately, Lihua did not know if she wanted 
another. She was worried about managing pregnancy, giving birth at an older age, and taking 
care of the child along with, in the future, grandchildren. Still, Lihua’s parents and in-laws 
pressured her into keeping the child. She exclaimed, “I told them I was already so old, and there 
was a lot of risk. They said, ‘Don’t worry about it, get a Caesarean section.’ They all wanted me 
to have another!” She said she would have been less reluctant if the policy had changed a few 
years earlier.  
Dr. Ma, one of the doctors interviewed, also regretted the timing of the two-child policy. As 
a woman in her early forties, she could not decide whether she wanted to have a second child:  
 
“The two-child policy put our generation in an awkward position—it’s not easy for us to give 
birth anymore, since we’re so old. But our desire to have a second child is even stronger 
because we grew-up with siblings.” (44 years old, Jiangshan, attending physician) 
 
Such women caught by the timing of the two-child policy expressed worry about their bodies’ 
ability to handle pregnancy and childbirth. They were also concerned that they would not have 
the energy to take care of a new-born. Dr. Wang said that as a physician, she advised many older 
women not to get pregnant given their age or physical health. However, she remarked, “Chinese 
women put their physical health last if everyone in the family really wants to have a child. Women 
will face a lot of risk to give birth. The doctor will tell them: don’t give birth anymore. But the 
woman simply wants another child.”   
 
Sacrificing career, time and freedom 
 
While physical concerns were a prominent issue among older women, the sacrifice of personal 
freedoms was another, particularly among younger women. Such women were more worried 
about the opportunity cost of raising children to developing their own careers or pursuing other 
interests. Aili, a 24-year-old with a job at a large Hangzhou e-commerce company, had an 
unintended pregnancy, and she did not plan on having a second child. She said, 
 
“Without children, you could use your breaks to go on vacation, and to do whatever 
you’re interested in. I could work until late at night, or even go out with friends. Now I 
will have to go back to breastfeed the child. If the child gets sick, I have to take leave to 
take care of him. Of course, a lot of things will be sacrificed for him.” (24-year-old, 
Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree) 
 
Huiqing, born in the 70s, set herself apart from these younger mothers who did not see 
value in having more than one child. She attributed this to the differences in the pre-1980s and 
post-1980s generation, before and after the beginning of China’s rapid economic growth:  
 
“Nowadays everyone is so independent. Women aren’t like how they were before, taking 
care of children and cooking dinner at home. Everyone is out working, like their husband. 
So, I think the young, the white-collared, the college-educated, the ones who have a 
career—they are the ones who don’t want another child.” (45 years old, Jiangshan, middle 
school, homemaker) 
 
Such women with careers had to rely heavily on their parents to take care of their child, 
and those who had no extra caregiver often opted not to have another child.  For example, Dr. 
Wang revealed she wanted a second child, but could not possibly see how she could do it: 
 
“I’m in a sticky situation because there’s no one in my family to take care of the child. 
Because if there isn’t, then you have to hire a carer. And if you hire a carer you have to be 
able to afford it.” (40 years old, Jiangshan, physician) 
 
 This was an issue for Lili, a 40-year-old who moved back to Jiangshan from Wenzhou, a 
city 335 kilometres away, so that she could be closer to her family. As a migrant worker with a 
middle school education, she gave up her job in Wenzhou, so she and her child could be taken 
care of by her parents. In Chinese culture, and in the absence of affordable childcare, it is a virtual 
expectation that grandparents who have the time and energy take care of grandchildren, 
particularly if both parents are working. However, in the case that grandparents are not available, 
it is the woman who must either give up her work, or else give up the idea of another child. 
Having children, therefore, is viewed as the woman’s sacrifice.  
 
Sacrificing financial resources and raising the perfect child 
 
Above all, women emphasised the financial sacrifices they would have to make if they were 
considering having a second child. Some, such as Changying, framed the economic burden in 
terms of wanting the best, and therefore the most expensive, for the child. She said, 
 
“Raising and educating a child is expensive. Because now there’s fewer kids in the home, 
of course parents want to do what they can to give their child the best environment.  
Here in China, we all buy imported goods for our children because we trust them [to be 
safer than Chinese goods]—but they are expensive. I always ask others to buy things 
abroad for me, like medications and toys.” (29 years old, Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree, 
temporarily unemployed) 
 
Many more also discussed their concerns about the finances to raise and educate the best 
kind of child: paying for them to get into a good school and attend extracurricular classes and 
activities. As Chuntao, a 35-year-old first-time mother said, 
 
“You have to pay-out a lot for children from a young age. You have to pay for 
extracurricular classes. You don’t want them to lag behind, and you don’t want them to 
not participate in anything—otherwise it wouldn’t be good for their development.” (35 
years old, Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree, office worker) 
 
Others felt guilty for having more children, because it diluted the resources they could 
give towards each child. Meilin felt that keeping her second child would be unfair to her first:  
 
“Let’s say I have 1,000,000 RMB. I can put all of that on one child. But now I have two 
children. Now it becomes 500,000 RMB each. For the first child, I could have given him a 
better education. But if the economic circumstances don’t allow it, then I can only give 
him the lesser option.  In this kind of society, it’s better to give your child the best, so he 
can improve his own abilities.” (32 years old, Jiangshan, high school, shop owner) 
 
For these women, the decision to have more children is fraught with considerations of 
money, particularly as the cost of childbearing, childrearing and education have increased 
enormously, and as individual households must bear such costs (Zheng et al. 2009). Their 
responses indicate that they want successful children in this competitive society, and will choose 
to concentrate resources on one child to bring out their full potential (Morgan and Taylor 2006; 
Zheng et al. 2009; Settles et al. 2013; Zhang 2007). These individual decisions are perhaps 
reflections of the original intent of China’s family planning campaigns to reduce population 
“quantity” while raising population “quality” (suzhi) (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). They also 
reveal how the deepening of market reforms and neoliberalism on a larger scale have impacted 
on education and increased household costs, thereby affecting childbearing decision-making 
(Hannum and Park 2007). 
Moreover, these economic pressures were not limited to raising children, but supporting 
them when they go to college, find jobs and get married. Women, particularly in Jiangshan, held 
the belief that parents should do their utmost to help their children in adulthood—and, as will 
be explained below, this economic burden was particularly heavy for sons. Nurse Cui noted:  
 
“We have to help [sons] until they are so old. When they get out of college, you have to 
buy them a home [or apartment]. If they’re working and only earn three to four thousand 
a month, they won’t even have enough to rent a place and pay living expenses… So, 
parents have to buy them a house. Then once they have a child, you have to help take 
care of their child.” (38 years old, Jiangshan, scrub nurse)  
 
The Two-Child Policy and Avoidance of Bearing Sons 
 
One boy, one girl 
 
Traditionally, gender composition has been an important factor in family planning, and with the 
two-child policy, families came to explicitly consider it during childbearing decision-making. 
According to interviewees, most families’ ideal was to have one girl and one boy (Chi et al. 2013; 
Ding and Hesketh 2006; Eklund and Göransson 2016). As Zhengmei, a 39-year-old from Jiangshan, 
noted in the Chinese language: “If you have a girl (女) and a boy (子), it forms the word “good” 
(好). So, if you have one girl and one boy, you’re complete in both respects.” Lin even saw 
something online:  
 
“I read there was a minority group in which they used a medicine: if the first was a son, 
they take the medicine, and the next time it will definitely be a girl. Wouldn’t that be great? 
In that case, we don’t have to have this family planning policy, right. Everyone would have 
two, a boy and a girl.” (39 years old, Jiangshan, vocational college, shop owner) 
 
Still, the lack of ability to control the gender composition, as well as the economic costs 
of sons, played a key role in the decision to have multiple children.  
 
The financial burden of marrying sons 
 
While the ideal was to have two children, one boy and one girl, many women, particularly in 
Jiangshan, hesitated to have another child if their first was a son. In contrast, if the first was a 
daughter, most would consider a second child. In Zhejiang and other provinces, the government, 
in recognition of son preference, institutionalised this even prior to the two-child policy: those 
who had a rural residency status could have a second child if their first was a girl. However, now 
that the choice to have another child was available to everyone, the decision became based on 
the economic costs of gender: raising two sons was simply too economically burdensome. 
Therefore, those with one son had to also decide whether the benefits of having two children 
would outweigh the possibility of having another son, an economic risk. Jinghua had just given 
birth to a boy, her first child, and expressed her disappointment:  
 
“If I had a girl, I would have definitely considered [another child]. Now that I have a son, I 
don’t want to have another. It’s hard to take the risk. With boys you have to think about 
the long-term, and you have to invest more. We have to help him find a job, marry him 
off, take care of his kids.  With girls we don’t really.” (23 years old, Jiangshan, high school, 
supermarket supervisor) 
 
In the past, historical, cultural and economic factors underlay son preference in China: 
sons could carry on the family line, provide labour on the farm, or support their parents in old 
age (Arnold and Liu 1986). However, few women during our interviews described any of these 
traditional ideas as impacting their own decision-making.  Instead, more women discussed their 
economic concerns about raising sons, embedded in patriarchal Chinese culture in which 
daughters are usually married out of the family, and sons tend to “fetch” the bride. In particular, 
the groom’s parents are expected to provide housing for the couple and pay bride wealth to the 
bride’s family. Given increasingly expensive housing prices and marriage costs, and the fact that 
a man in present-day China without a house would be hard-pressed to find a wife, parents 
anticipate the economic burden even from when the son is born (Eklund and Göransson 2016; 
Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2012; Wei and Zhang 2009). These concerns have led to the 
avoidance of bearing more than one son due to economic risk (Chi et al. 2013; Eklund 2016). 
 
Urban and rural differences 
 
Still, these preferences for specific genders may be stronger in rural areas such as Jiangshan; most 
interviewees in Hangzhou expressed sex indifference. Many of these women who were college-
educated and born in the 80s and 90s claimed that the sex of the child had no bearing on whether 
they wanted more children. They rejected the idea that there was a larger financial burden with 
sons, saying that if they had the means to, they would buy homes for both sons and daughters. 
If they did not, they would let the children be financially independent themselves. Hualing’s 
mother’s siblings all had one child, and none believed in the tradition of “marrying out” daughters 
to another family or preparing a home only for their sons: 
 
“We’re all only children. And they all prepared homes—regardless if they’re married out. 
We don’t separate between marrying out or into a family. The two families are considered 
combined.” (26 years old, Hangzhou, bachelor’s degree, temporarily unemployed) 
 
They emphasised that raising children well was more important, not worrying about 
paying for their future home. In fact, some even suggested that male children should be able to 
make money for themselves, like Jia: “I told [my husband] this—if we have two children, they 
won’t use our money. If they want to use money, they earn their own.” Many of them also 
strongly emphasised the role of social security and self-reliance and not relying on sons or 
children for old age support. This suggests that, at least in urban areas, considerations of 
intergenerational financial obligations are changing.  
 
Discussion 
 
Since 1979, many Chinese women, mostly in urban areas, have grown up believing they would 
only have one child. With the gradual relaxation of the policy in the past decade, and finally its 
complete lifting in 2016, this is no longer the case. Now all women have the choice to have two 
children. However, this new choice and control over childbearing has brought to light other 
reproductive concerns for women and their families, which reflects a societal shift in traditional 
Chinese family decision-making.  
 From a fertility perspective, our qualitative study elaborates on what quantitative studies 
have revealed as a gap between families’ ideal and actual family composition, or expressed 
fertility preferences and actual behaviour (Zheng 2013; Bao, Chen and Zheng 2017; Basten and 
Gu 2013). In particular, while most women are often happy to be allowed a second child, they 
must balance considerations of present sacrifices with future familial gains. That the rhetoric of 
having children is overwhelmingly phrased in terms of burden helps to explain why there is such 
low fertility intention in China (Zheng et al. 2009).  
Our study also helps to explain changes to Chinese patriarchal culture along generational 
and gender axes (Santos and Harrell 2016). Traditional childbearing decision-making emphasised 
considerations of intergenerational responsibility, care of elders and son preference. While these 
still persist, they have taken on different forms and now compete with other reasons—children’s 
psychological health, women’s careers and the financial burdens of childbearing—for having or 
not having a second child. The moral and emotional basis of generational relationships is 
changing: There are increasingly more resource flows out to the next generation, while 
traditional expectations for reciprocation from children are decreasing (Santos and Harrell 2016; 
Zhan 2004; Eklund and Göransson 2016; Zhang 2007).  As in other low-fertility societies, families 
in China are increasingly dependent on two incomes to survive, and women struggle to balance 
raising a family with pursuing a career and earning money (Frejka, Jones and Sardon 2010; Raymo 
et al. 2015). The lack of social welfare or institutional support for childcare means that the burden 
of childrearing continues to rest on the family (Eklund and Göransson 2016). This shortfall, in 
combination with the rising cost of raising a child in an increasingly competitive society, leads 
women to have fewer children in whom they can invest more (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; 
Eklund and Göransson 2016). 
These tensions are exacerbated when it comes to gender preference. Even before the 
relaxation of the policy, two sons were seen as too financially burdensome in rural areas where 
second children were permitted, owing to future economic investment for sons’ marriages 
(Greenhalgh, Zhu and Li 1994; Chu 2001). Women, particularly in Jiangshan, tried to avoid this 
economic risk, which, in turn, drove many decisions to have or forgo second children (Eklund 
2016). These behaviours demonstrate how childbearing decision-making in the new multiparous 
era continues to be gendered, embedded in a patriarchal society in which parents need to invest 
more in a son who must attract a wife with a house and financial resources. This reaction, 
however, was much less evident in urban areas where traditional marriage customs and reliance 
on sons have weakened. 
While China has relaxed some of its control over reproduction, our study supports the 
idea that families’ reproductive choices are based more on social and economic factors (Zeng and 
Hesketh 2016).  Consequently, the new family planning policy is unlikely to significantly increase 
population size or reverse population ageing (Wang, Cai and Gu 2013). As long as the opportunity 
costs of having and rearing children remain high, there will continue to be a gap between families’ 
ideal and actual number of children. This gap can only close if the government starts to offer 
social and financial assistance, as well as maternity and paternity benefits and legal protections 
for mothers within the labour market (Attané 2016; Wang, Gu and Cai 2016). Finally, we note 
that while many women in this study embrace their expansion of reproductive choice, this 
“choice” is still confined to two children; although this is an improvement from previous policies, 
reproductive rights are still not fully granted in present-day China.   
Our study has a few limitations: our interviewees were a specific group of postpartum 
women giving birth very soon after the implementation of the two-child policy, in a wealthy 
province of China, and they are not intended to be representative of the views of women across 
the entire country. Although we did interview primiparous women who did not intend to have a 
second child, we did not specifically sample for those who only intended one. Moreover, many 
women did not explicitly discuss the roles their husbands played in the decision-making process, 
likely because their husband was also in the room, or because they spoke on behalf of them as a 
couple. Therefore, the husband’s exact role may be underemphasised. Finally, our interviews do 
not account for all aspects of family planning, including abortion and contraceptive use, which 
could have been illuminating in the era of contraceptive choice. Further research should include 
husbands and other family members, and explore the impact of two-child policy on other aspects 
of family planning and reproductive decisions, such as those explicitly related to contraception, 
abortions, and fertility treatments. In the long-term, research should continue to follow changes 
in family planning policy and explore how they affect family dynamics and kinship structure over 
time, particularly as China continues to modernise and develop economically.  
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Table 1: Sociodemographic characteristics of postpartum 
women interviewed 
 
  Hangzhou  Jiangshan 
Parity 
Primiparous (p=1) 10 6 
Multiparous (p>=2) 14 15 
Mean age of first 
child ± SD (range) 7 ± 5.1 (2-21) 8.3 ± 5.2 (2-17) 
First child daughter  6 9 
First child son 8 6 
Age 
Mean ± SD (range) 
32.5 ± 0.90 
(25-44) 
32.2 ± 1.28 (23-
45) 
20-24 0 2 
25-29 6 6 
30-34 10 6 
35-39 7 5 
40-45 1 2 
Highest Educational Qualification 
Middle School 2 3 
High School 1 9 
Vocational college 1 6 
Bachelor's 17 3 
Postgraduate 3 0 
Currently Employed 
Yes 19 10 
No 5 11 
 
 
